e frequent use than any other species of trespass on the
case, or, perhaps than any other form of action whatever. These are
Assumpsit and Trover.

"The action of _assumpsit_ lies where a party claims damages for breach of
simple contract, _i. e. a promise not under seal_."

The action of _trover_ differs from _detinue_ inasmuch as the party claims
_damages_, not the recovery of the identical goods and chattels. With the
action of _replevin_ we will not trouble our readers, to whom we ought,
perhaps, to apologise for entering thus far into legal technicalities.

But now, reflect a moment on this classification. A promise under seal
must assuredly require a different proof from a promise not under seal;
but what end is answered by calling one an action of _covenant_ and the
other an action of _assumpsit_? Or what good result can arise from
limiting the definition of _debt_ to the claim of a sum certain? Who sees
not what a snare may be here laid for the feet of unwary suitors? The
names of _trover_, _detinue_, _trespass_, give no information to the
defendant; the substantial cause of action is stated in the declaration,
and these names are mere useless additions. Yet the right name must be
chosen, or it is fatal to the suit. If _trespass_ be adopted instead of
_trespass on the case_, the error is fatal; and yet mark how lucid, how
intelligible, how satisfactory is the classification designated by these
terms of art.

Trespass is the proper form of action when the injury has been committed
_with violence_ This looks sufficiently distinct. But then the violence
may be either _actual_ or _implied_; and the law will imply violence
wherever the injury is _direct_, and the property injured of a _tangible_
nature. In the most stealthy, peaceable entrance upon another man's land,
the law implies violence. What, therefore, may or may not be said, in the
usual phrase, to be done _vi et armis_, remains to be known, by no means
from the nature of the facts themselves, but from arbitrary decisions of
courts. To make out a class of actions as those committed with violence,
and then to imply violence where in reality there is none, is first to
make and then unmake the distinction. And yet, as some distinction is, for
the embarrassment of suitors, to be retained, this implication of violence
is restricted to cases where the injury is _direct_ and not
_consequential_; and what shall be denominated a direct and what a
consequential inj