gs simply agreeable,
or disagreeable, are of the first Sort, all the World may judge alike of
these, for example the most Ignorant in Musick, perceives very well,
when a Player on the Lute strikes one String for another, because he
judges by his Sense, and that Sense is the Rule; in such occasions, we
may therefore very well say, that all that pleases is good, because that
which is Good doth please, or that which is Evil never fails to
displease; for neither the Passions, nor Ignorance dull the Senses, on
the contrary they sharpen them. 'Tis not so in Things which spring from
Reason; Passion and Ignorance act very strongly on it, and oftentimes
choak it, this is the Reason, why we ordinarily judge so ill, and
differently concerning those Things, of which, that is the Rule and the
Cause. Why, what is Bad often pleases, and that which is Good doth not
always so, 'tis not the fault of the Object, 'tis the fault of him who
judges; but what is Good will infallibly please those who can judge,
and that's sufficient. By this we may see, that a Play, that shall bring
those Things which are to be judg'd of by Reason, within the Rules, as
also what is to be judg'd of by the Sense, shall never fail to please,
for it will please both the Learned, and Ignorant: Now this Conformity
of suffrages is the most sure,[19] or according to _Aristotle_ the only
Mark of the Good, and Pleasant, as he proves in the following part of
his Discourse. Now these Suffrages are not obtained, but by the
observation of the Rules, and consequently, these Rules are the only
Cause of the Good, and Pleasant, whether they are follow'd Methodically
and with Design, or by Hazard only; for 'tis certain, there are many
Persons who are entirely Ignorant of these Rules, and yet don't fail to
succeed in several Affairs: This is far from destroying the Rules, and
serves to shew their Beauty, and proves how far they are conformable to
Nature, since those often follow them, who know nothing of 'em. In the
Remarks you shall find many Examples of the vast difference, the
observance or neglect of the Rules make in the same Subject, and by that
be throughly convinc'd that they are the two only Causes of Good, or Bad
Works, and that there can never be any occasion, where the perfect
Harmony which is between the Rules, and what pleases, shou'd be broken.

'Tis true to come to the last Consequence, that Poetry is an Art,
invented for the Instruction of Mankind, and consequently