sequence, is in no wise a_ Tragedy_, for a _Tragedy_ cannot
subsist without a Fable,[18] as you will see elsewhere.

We come now to the first Consequence, which we draw, from what we have
Establish'd, and shall endeavour to prove, that our Laws, and what
pleases, can never be opposite, since the Rules were made only for what
pleases, and tend only to show the way you must walk in, to do so. By
this we shall destroy the false Maxim, That, _all that pleases is good_,
and assert that we ought on the contrary to say, That, _all that is good
pleases, or ought to please_. For the goodness of any Work whatsoever,
does not proceed from this, that it gives us pleasure, but the pleasure
that we have proceeds from its goodness, unless our deluded Eyes and
corrupt Imaginations mislead us, for that which causes our mistakes, is
not, where is, but what is not.

If the Rules, and what pleased, were things opposite, you would never
arrive at the giving pleasure, but by meer chance, which is absurd:
There must for that reason be a certain way, which leads thither, and
that way is the Rule which we ought to learn; but what is that Rule?
'Tis a Precept, which being drawn from the _Pleasant_ and _Profitable_,
leads us to their source. Now what is the _Pleasant_ and _Profitable_?
'Tis that which pleases naturally, in all Arts 'tis this we consult,
'tis the most sure and perfect Model we can Imitate; in it we find
perfect Unity and Order, for it self is Order, or to speak more
properly, the effect of Order, and the Rule which conducts us thither;
there is but one way to find Order, but a great many to fall into
Confusion.

There would be nothing bad in the World, if all that pleas'd were good;
for there is nothing so ridiculous, but what will have its Admirers. You
may say indeed, 'tis no truer, that what is good pleases, because we see
ev'ry day Disputes about the Good and Pleasant, that the same Thing
pleases some, and displeases others; nay, it pleases and displeases the
very same Persons at different times: from whence then proceeds this
difference? It comes either from an absolute Ignorance of the Rule, or
that the Passions alter it. Rightly to clear this Truth, I believe I may
lay down this Maxim, that all sensible Objects are of two sorts; some
may be judged of, by Sense independantly from Reason. I can Sense that
Impression which the animal Spirits make on the Soul, others can't be
judged of but by Reason exercised in Science, Thin