nged, our policy need not be
altogether reversed, but it must necessarily be subjected to
modifications in order to meet changed conditions. If we stand still
while Russia is going fast ahead, we are perforce left behind. The
policy of drift, which we seem to favour, is bound to lead us to
disaster, and when we couple with it inefficacious resistance and bigoted
obstruction we cannot be surprised if, in the end, it only yields us
bitter disappointment, extensive losses, enmity and derision.

The policy of drift is merely caused by our absolute ignorance of foreign
countries. We drift simply because we do not know what else to do. We
hear noble lords in the Government say that the reason we did not lend
Persia the paltry two and a half millions sterling was because "men of
business do not lend money except on proper security, and that before
embarking on any such policy the Government must be anxious to see
whether the security is both sufficient and suitable." Yes, certainly,
but why did the Government not see? Had the Government seen they
certainly would have effected the loan. Surely, well-known facts, already
mentioned in previous pages, have proved very luminously our folly in
taking the advice of incompetent men who judge of matters with which, to
say the least, they are not familiar. But the real question appears to
be, not how to make a safe and profitable financial investment, which is
no part of the functions of the British or any other Government, but
rather whether it is not better to lay out a certain sum for a valuable
political object than to allow a formidable competitor to do so to our
prejudice.

Hence the disadvantageous position in which we find ourselves at
present, all over Asia, but particularly in Persia. It would no doubt be
the perfection of an agreement if an amicable understanding could be
arrived at with Russia, not only regarding Persia but including China,
Manchuria, and Corea as well. A frank and fair adjustment of Russian and
British interests in these countries could be effected without serious
difficulty, mutual concessions could advantageously be granted, and
mutual advice and friendly support would lead to remarkably prosperous
results for both countries.

Russia, notwithstanding all we hear of her, would only be too glad to
make sacrifices and concessions in order to have the friendship and
support of England, and Russia's friendship to England would, I think, be
of very great ass