who lay concealed there. To attack
this strong position General Macdonald sent Captain Bethune with one
company of the 32nd Pioneers, placing Lieutenant Cook with his Maxim on
a mound at 500 yards to cover Bethune's advance. Bethune led a frontal
attack. The Tibetans fired wildly until the Sikhs were within eighty
yards, and then fled up the valley. Not a single man of the 32nd was hit
during the attack, though one sepoy was wounded in the pursuit by a
bullet in the hand from a man who lay concealed behind a rock within a
few yards of him. While the 32nd were dislodging the Tibetans from the
path and the rocks above it, the mounted infantry galloped through them
to reconnoitre ahead and cut off the fugitives in the valley. They also
came through the enemy's fire at very close quarters without a casualty.
On emerging from the gorge the mounted infantry discovered that the
ridge the Tibetans had held was shaped like the letter S, so that by
doubling back along an almost parallel valley they were able to
intercept the enemy whom the Gurkhas had driven down the cliffs. The
unfortunate Tibetans were now hemmed in between two fires, and hardly a
man of them escaped.

The Tibetan casualties, as returned at the time, were much exaggerated.
The killed amounted to 100, and, on the principle that the proportion of
wounded must be at least two to one, it was estimated that their losses
were 300. But, as a matter of fact, the wounded could not have numbered
more than two dozen.

The prisoners taken by the Gurkhas on the top of the ridge turned out to
be impressed peasants, who had been compelled to fight us by the Lamas.
They were not soldiers by inclination or instinct, and I believe their
greatest fear was that they might be released and driven on to fight us
again.

The action at the Red Idol Gorge may be regarded as the end of the first
phase of the Tibetan opposition. We reached Gyantse on April 11, and the
fort was surrendered without resistance. Nothing had occurred on the
march up to disturb our estimate of the enemy. Since the campaign of
1888 no one had given the Tibetans any credit for martial instincts, and
until the Karo la action and the attack on Gyantse they certainly
displayed none. It would be hard to exaggerate the strategical
difficulties of the country through which we had to pass. The progress
of the mission and its escort under similar conditions would have been
impossible on the North-West frontier or in a