a cul-de-sac. Looking up from the valley, it appeared
that the spot where they stood commanded the enemy's position, but we
had not reckoned on the traverses. This amazing advance in the enemy's
defensive tactics had rendered their position unassailable from the
left, and made the Gurkhas' flanking movement a splendid failure.

It was now two o'clock, and, except for the capture of the enemy's right
sangars, we had done nothing to weaken their opposition. The frontal and
flanking attacks had failed. Bethune was killed, and seventeen men. Our
guns had made no impression on their wall. Looking down from the spur
which overlooked the Tibetan camp and the valley beyond, the Gurkhas
could see a large reinforcement of at least 500 men coming up to join
the enemy. The situation was critical. In four hours we had done
nothing, and we knew that if we could not take the place by dusk we
would have to abandon the attack or attempt to rush the camp at night.
That would have been a desperate undertaking--400 men against 3,000, a
rush at close quarters with the bayonet, in which the superiority of our
modern rifles would be greatly discounted.

Matters were at this crisis, when we saw the Tibetans running out of
their extreme left sangars. At twelve o'clock, when the front attack had
failed and the left attack was apparently making no progress, fifteen
men of the 32nd who were held in reserve were sent up the hill on the
right. They had reached a point above the enemy's left forward sangar,
and were firing into it with great effect. Twice the Tibetans rushed
out, and, coming under a heavy Maxim fire, bolted back again. The third
time they fled in a mass, and the Maxims mowed down about thirty. The
capture of the sangars was a signal for a general stampede. From the
position they had won the Sikhs could enfilade the main wall itself. The
Tibetans only waited a few shots; then they turned and fled in three
huge bodies down the valley. Thus the fifteen Sikhs on the right saved
the situation. The tension had been great. In no other action during the
campaign, if we except Palla, did the success of our arms stand so long
in doubt. Had we failed to take the wall by daylight, Colonel Brander's
column would have been in a most precarious position. We could not
afford to retire, and a night attack could only have been pushed home
with heavy loss.

Directly the flight began, the 1st Mounted Infantry--forty-two men,
under Captain Ottley--rode