up to the wall. They were ten minutes making
a breach. Then they poured into the valley and harassed the flying
masses, riding on their flanks and pursuing them for ten miles to within
sight of the Yamdok Tso. It showed extraordinary courage on the part of
this little band of Masbis and Gurkhas that they did not hesitate to
hurl themselves on the flanks of this enormous body of men, like
terriers on the heels of a flock of cattle, though they had had
experience of their stubborn resistance the whole day long, and rode
through the bodies of their fallen comrades. Not a man drew rein. The
Tibetans were caught in a trap. The hills that sloped down to the valley
afforded them little cover. Their fate was only a question of time and
ammunition. The mounted infantry returned at night with only three
casualties, having killed over 300 men.
The sortie to the Karo la was one of the most brilliant episodes of the
campaign. We risked more then than on any other occasion. But the safety
of the mission and many isolated posts on the line was imperilled by
this large force at the cross-roads, which might have increased until it
had doubled or trebled if we had not gone out to disperse it. A weak
commander might have faltered and weighed the odds, but Colonel Brander
saw that it was a moment to strike, and struck home. His action was
criticised at the time as too adventurous. But the sortie is one of the
many instances that our interests are best cared for by men who are
beyond the telegraph-poles, and can act on their own initiative without
reference to Government offices in Simla.
As the column advanced to the Karo la, a message was received that the
mission camp at Gyantse had been attacked in the early morning of the
5th, and that Major Murray's men--150 odd rifles--had not only beaten
the enemy off, but had made three sorties from different points and
killed 200.
With the action at the Karo la and the attack on the mission at Gyantse
began the second phase of the operations, during which we were
practically besieged in our own camp, and for nine weeks compelled to
act on the defensive. The courage of the Tibetans was now proved beyond
a doubt. The new levies from Kham and Shigatze were composed of very
different men from those we herded like sheep at Guru. They were also
better armed than our previous assailants, and many of them knew how to
shoot. At the same time they were better led. The primitive ideas of
strategy hith
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