vice of Tibetan warfare, which was only employed against our troops on
this occasion. An artificial avalanche of rocks and stones is so
cunningly contrived that the removal of one stone sends the whole engine
of destruction thundering down the hillside. Luckily, the Tibetans did
not wait for our main body, but loosed the machine on an advance guard
of mounted infantry, who were in extended order and able to take shelter
behind rocks.

On the return of the reconnaissance Colonel Brander decided to attack,
as he considered the gathering threatened the safety of the mission. The
Karo Pass is an important strategical position, lying as it does at the
junction of the two roads to India, one of which leads to Kangma, the
other to Gyantse. A strong force holding the pass might at any moment
pour troops down the valley to Kangma, cut us off in the rear, and
destroy our line of communications. When Colonel Brander led his small
force to take the pass, it was not with the object of clearing the road
to Lhasa. The measure was purely defensive: the action was undertaken to
keep the road open for convoys and reinforcements, and to protect
isolated posts on the line. The force with the mission was still an
'escort,' and so far its operations had been confined to dispersing the
armed levies that blocked the road.

On May 3 Colonel Brander left Gyantse with his column of 400 rifles,
comprising three companies of the 32nd Pioneers, under Captains Bethune
and Cullen and Lieutenant Hodgson; one company of the 8th, under Major
Row and Lieutenant Coleridge, with two 7-pounder guns; the Maxim
detachment of the Norfolks, under Lieutenant Hadow; and forty-five of
the 1st Mounted Infantry, under Captain Ottley. On the first day the
column marched eighteen miles, and halted at Gobshi. On the second day
they reached Ralung, eleven miles further, and on the third marched up
the pass and encamped on an open spot about two miles from where the
Tibetans had built their wall. A reconnaissance that afternoon estimated
the enemy at 2,000, and they were holding the strongest position on the
road to Lhasa. They had built a wall the whole length of a narrow spur
and up the hill on the other side of the stream, and in addition held
detached sangars high up the steep hills, and well thrown forward. Their
flanks rested on very high and nearly precipitous rocks. It was only
possible to climb the ridge on our right from a mile behind, and on the
left from near