to the definitive propositions of Napoleon, the latter, becoming
impatient, sent additional forces to Dantzic, and made Davoust enter
Pomerania. His orders for this invasion of a Swedish province were
repeated and pressing; they were grounded on the illicit commerce
carried on by the Pomeranians with the English, and subsequently on the
necessity of compelling Prussia to accede to his terms. The Prince of
Eckmuehl even received orders to hold himself in readiness to take
immediate possession of that kingdom, and to seize the person of her
sovereign, if within eight days from the date of these orders the latter
had not concluded the offensive alliance dictated to him by France; but
while the marshal was tracing the few marches necessary for this
operation, he received intelligence that the treaty of the 21st of
February, 1812, had been ratified.

This submission did not altogether satisfy Napoleon. To his strength he
added artifice; his suspicions still led him to covet the occupation of
the fortresses, which he was ashamed not to leave in Frederick's hands;
he required the king to keep only 50 or 80 invalids in some, and desired
that some French officers should be admitted into others; all of whom
were to send their reports to him, and to follow his orders. His
solicitude extended to every thing. "Spandau," said he, in his letters
to Davoust, "is the citadel of Berlin, as Pillau is that of Koenigsberg;"
and French troops had orders to be ready to introduce themselves at the
first signal: the manner he himself pointed out. At Potsdam, which the
king had reserved for himself, and which our troops were interdicted
from entering, his orders were, that the French officers should
frequently show themselves, in order to observe, and to accustom the
people to the sight of them. He recommended every degree of respect to
be shown, both to the king and his subjects; but at the same time he
required that every sort of arms should be taken from the latter, which
might be of use to them in an insurrection; and he pointed out every
thing of the kind, even to the smallest weapon. Anticipating the
possibility of the loss of a battle, and the chances of Prussian
_vespers_, he ordered that his troops should be either put into barracks
or encampments, with a thousand other precautions of the minutest
description. As a final security, in case of the English making a
descent between the Elbe and the Vistula, although Victor, and
subsequent