of Bosnia; France the other part
of that province, Albania, Macedonia, and all Greece as far as
Thessalonica: Constantinople, Adrianople, and Thrace, were to be left to
the Turks.
Whether the conferences respecting this partition were really of a
serious nature, or merely the communication of a great idea, is
uncertain; so much is certain, that shortly after the interview at
Tilsit, Alexander's ambition was very sensibly moderated. The
suggestions of prudence had shown him the danger of substituting for the
ignorant, infatuated, and feeble Turkey, an active, powerful, and
unaccommodating neighbour. In his conversations on the subject at that
time, he remarked, "that he had already too much desert country; that he
knew too well, by the occupation of the Crimea, which was still
depopulated, the value of conquest over foreign and hostile religions
and manners; that besides, France and Russia were too strong to become
such near neighbours; that two such powerful bodies coming into
immediate contact, would be sure to jostle; and that it was much better
to leave intermediate powers between them."
On the other side, the French emperor urged the matter no further; the
Spanish insurrection diverted his attention, and imperiously required
his presence with all his forces. Even previous to the interview at
Erfurt, after Sebastiani's return from Constantinople, although Napoleon
still seemed to adhere to the idea of dismembering Turkey in Europe, he
had admitted the correctness of his ambassador's reasoning: "That in
this partition, the advantages would be all against him; that Russia and
Austria would acquire contiguous provinces, which would make their
dominions more complete, while we should be obliged to keep 80,000 men
continually in Greece to retain it in subjection; that such an army,
from the distance and losses it would sustain from long marches, and the
novelty and unhealthiness of the climate, would require 30,000 recruits
annually, a number which would quite drain France: that a line of
operation extending from Athens to Paris, was out of all proportion;
that besides, it was strangled in its passage at Trieste, at which point
only two marches would enable the Austrians to place themselves across
it, and thereby cut off our army of observation in Greece from all
communication with Italy and France."
Here Napoleon exclaimed, "that Austria certainly complicated every
thing; that she was there like a dead weight; that
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