But at length this respectful taciturnity, which he himself had taken
pains to impose, became disagreeable; he suspected that it proceeded
more from disapprobation than reserve. Obedience was not sufficient for
him; it was his wish to combine it with conviction: that was like
another conquest. Besides, no one was more convinced than himself of
the power of public opinion, which, according to him, _created or
destroyed sovereigns_. In short, whether through policy or self-love, it
was his desire to persuade.

Such were the dispositions of Napoleon and of the grandees who
surrounded him, when the veil being about to be rent, and war evident,
their silence towards him assumed a greater appearance of indiscretion
than hazarding a few timely words. Some of them, therefore, commenced
the task, and the emperor anticipated the others.

A show was made[5] at first of comprehending all the emergencies of his
position. "It was necessary to complete what had been begun; it was
impossible to stop in the midst of so rapid an acclivity, and so near
the summit. The empire of Europe was adapted to his genius; France would
become its centre and its base; great and entire, she would perceive
around her none but states so feeble and so divided, that all coalition
among them would become contemptible or impossible; but with such an
object why did he not commence the task by subjecting and partitioning
the states immediately around him?"

[Footnote 5: The arch-chancellor.]

To this objection Napoleon replied, "That such had been his project in
1809, in the war with Austria, but that the misfortune of Esslingen had
deranged his plan; that that event, and the doubtful dispositions which
Russia had since exhibited, had led him to marry an Austrian princess,
and strengthen himself by an alliance with the Austrian against the
Russian emperor.

"That he did not create circumstances, but that he would not allow them
to escape him; that he comprehended them all, and held himself in as
much readiness as possible for their appearance; that in order to
accomplish his designs, he was fully aware that twelve years were
necessary, but that he could not afford to wait so long.

"That besides, he had not provoked this war; that he had been faithful
to his engagements with Alexander; proofs of which were to be found in
the coldness of his relations with Turkey and Sweden, which had been
delivered up to Russia, one almost entirely, the other shorn o