was in this ambiguous position with the Turks, when all of a sudden,
on the 21st of March, 1812, only six weeks before the war with Russia
commenced, he solicited an alliance with Mahmoud: he demanded that,
within five days from the period of the communication, all negotiation
between the Turks and Russians should be broken off; and that an army of
100,000 men, commanded by the sultan himself, should march to the Danube
within nine days. The return which he proposed to make for this
assistance was, to put the Porte in possession of the very same Moldavia
and Wallachia, which, under the circumstances, the Russians were but too
happy to restore as the price of a speedy peace; and the promise of
procuring the restoration of the Crimea, which he had made six years
before to Selim, was again renewed.
We know not whether the time which this despatch would take to arrive at
Constantinople had been badly calculated, whether Napoleon believed the
Turkish army to be stronger than it really was, or whether he had
flattered himself with surprising and captivating the determination of
the divan by so sudden and advantageous a proposition. It can hardly be
supposed that he was ignorant of the long invariable custom of the
Mussulmans, which prevented the grand signor from ever appearing in
person at the head of his army.
It appears as if the genius of Napoleon could not stoop so low as to
impute to the divan the brutish ignorance which it exhibited of its real
interests. After the manner in which he had abandoned the interests of
Turkey in 1807, perhaps he did not make sufficient allowance for the
distrust which the Mussulmans were likely to entertain of his new
promises; he forgot that they were too ignorant to appreciate the change
which recent circumstances had effected in his political views; and that
barbarians like them could still less comprehend the feelings of dislike
with which they had inspired him, by their deposition and murder of
Selim, to whom he was attached, and in conjunction with whom he had
hoped to make European Turkey a military power capable of coping with
Russia.
Perhaps he might still have gained over Mahmoud to his cause, if he had
sooner made use of more potent arguments; but, as he has since expressed
himself, it revolted his pride to make use of corruption. We shall
besides shortly see him hesitating about beginning a war with Alexander,
or laying too much stress on the alarm with which his immense
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