longer be dangerous nor humiliating to reduce if the general reduction,
extending even to Japan and seconded by all the republics of the New
World, were agreed to by all. Certainly such an agreement would be
difficult to develop; it would terrify the diplomats, but outside of
such an agreement I see in perspective nothing but perpetual war,
internal revolution, and general ruin.

*Fifth Letter.*

PARIS, Sept. 18, 1914.

* * * The pride of an empire may not be crushed without a bitter
struggle. The German Government has at its disposition the live force of
a young and growing people. However, the day is coming when that people,
aware that they have been deceived, will be able to repudiate their
Government, just as the French people did after Sedan. Meanwhile the
German armies have stopped their retreat in order to form a new line of
resistance. But to what good? This line will be overthrown, and in the
end the German Army will be obliged to retreat in disorder and again to
cross the land which it has laid waste.

The true difficulties, in my opinion, are going to commence when the
conquered Germans must submit to the conditions made by the conquerors.
The victors will be able to agree, I believe, to stop the war and to
dictate conditions. But will they agree to make these conditions
moderate? That is the question. At that moment even France will be far
from unanimous, as she has been unanimous in defending herself. France
is of one opinion on these principal points:

1. Alsace-Lorraine ought to be liberated at last, free to return to
France; her rights ought to be respected and recognized. Such liberation
should extend as far as possible to every country in Europe whose right
has been violated.

2. We must make an end of ruinous armed peace, invented, so it was said,
to prevent war, but which has made war inevitable. German militarism
must be crushed unless it is again to become a menace and give the
signal for another competition of armaments. This peace will be only a
truce, a sinister comedy, unless it is crowned by a general convention
of disarmament, to which Germany must subscribe with all the others and
before all the others.

3. Arbitration, conciliation, all the means already provided for
amicable adjustment, and if possible for the prevention of international
conflicts, should be organized on a more solid and more definite basis
than in the past, with the sanction, or at least the maximum of
necess