ear to me in the first place
that, if we have no religious scruple about granting to this College
nine thousand pounds for one year, we ought to have no religious scruple
about granting twenty-six thousand pounds a year for an indefinite term.

Secondly, it seems to me that those persons who tell us that we ought
never in any circumstances to contribute to the propagation of error do
in fact lay down a rule which would altogether interdict the propagation
of truth.

Thirdly, it seems to me that, even on the hypothesis that the voluntary
principle is the sound principle, the present case is an excepted case,
to which it would be unjust and unwise to apply that principle.

So much, Sir, as to this bill; and now let me add a few words about
those by whom it has been framed and introduced. We were exhorted,
on the first night of this debate, to vote against the bill, without
inquiring into its merits, on the ground that, good or bad, it was
proposed by men who could not honestly and honourably propose it. A
similar appeal has been made to us this evening. In these circumstances,
Sir, I must, not I hope from party spirit, not, I am sure, from personal
animosity, but from a regard for the public interest, which must be
injuriously affected by everything which tends to lower the character
of public men, say plainly what I think of the conduct of Her Majesty's
Ministers. Undoubtedly it is of the highest importance that we should
legislate well. But it is also of the highest importance that those who
govern us should have, and should be known to have, fixed principles,
and should be guided by those principles both in office and in
opposition. It is of the highest importance that the world should not be
under the impression that a statesman is a person who, when he is out,
will profess and promise anything in order to get in, and who, when he
is in, will forget all that he professed and promised when he was out.
I need not, I suppose, waste time in proving that a law may be in itself
an exceedingly good law, and yet that it may be a law which, when viewed
in connection with the former conduct of those who proposed it, may
prove them to be undeserving of the confidence of their country. When
this is the case, our course is clear. We ought to distinguish between
the law and its authors. The law we ought, on account of its intrinsic
merits, to support. Of the authors of the law, it may be our duty to
speak in terms of censure.