ransubstantiation by dwelling upon the antinomies involved in the
argument for a Deity. As, in one case, we cannot give any meaning to an
existence without a beginning, so, in the other, we can attach no
meaning to the word 'substance.' If the analogy be correct, the true
inference would be that both doctrines are meaningless aggregations of
words, and therefore not capable of being in any true sense either
'believed' or 'disbelieved.' So again the view of the external world
suggests to Newman 'atheism, pantheism, or polytheism.' Almighty
benevolence has created a world of intelligent beings, most of whom are
doomed to eternal tortures, and having become incarnate in order to save
us, has altogether failed in His purpose. The inference is, says
Fitzjames, that 'if Dr. Newman was thoroughly honest he would become an
atheist.' The existence of evil is, in fact, an argument against the
goodness of God; though it may be, as Fitzjames thinks it is in fact,
overbalanced by other evidence. But if it be true that God has created
an immense proportion of men to be eternally tormented in hell fire, it
is nonsense to call Him benevolent, and the explanation by a supposed
'catastrophe' is a mere evasion.
In spite of this, Newman professes himself, and of course in all
sincerity, as much convinced of the existence of God as he is of his own
existence. The 'objections,' as he puts it, are only 'difficulties';
they make it hard to understand the theory, but are no more reasons for
rejecting it than would be the difficulty which a non-mathematical mind
finds in understanding the differential calculus for rejecting 'Taylor's
theorem.' And, so far, the difference is rather in the process than the
conclusion. Newman believes in God on the testimony of an inner voice,
so conclusive and imperative that he can dismiss all apparently
contradictory facts, and even afford, for controversial purposes, to
exaggerate them. Fitzjames, as a sound believer in Mill's logic, makes
the facts the base of his whole argumentative structure, though he
thinks that the evidence for a benevolent Deity is much stronger than
the evidence against it. When we come to the narrower question of the
truth of Christianity the difference is vital. Newman's course had, in
fact, been decided by a belief, however generated, in the 'principle of
dogma,' and on the other hand by the gradual discovery of the
unsatisfactory nature of the old-fashioned Protestant argument as
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