s mind to a
branch of legal practice which for sufficiently obvious reasons is
generally regarded as not deserving the attention of the higher class of
barristers. Fitzjames was always attracted by the dramatic interest of
important criminal cases, and by the close connection in various ways
between criminal law and morality. He had now gained sufficient
experience to speak with some authority upon a topic which was to occupy
him for many years. In his first principles he was an unhesitating
disciple of Bentham[90] and Austin. Bentham had given the first great
impulse to the reforms in the English Criminal Law, which began about
1827; and Austin had put Bentham's general doctrine into a rigid form
which to Fitzjames appeared perfectly satisfactory. Austin's authority
has declined as the historical method has developed; Fitzjames gives his
impression of their true relations in an article on 'Jurisprudence' in
the 'Edinburgh Review' of October 1861. He there reviews the
posthumously published lectures of Austin, along with Maine's great book
upon 'Ancient Law,' which in England heralded the new methods of
thought. His position is characteristic. He speaks enthusiastically of
Austin's services in accurately defining the primary conceptions with
which jurisprudence is conversant. The effect is, he says, nothing less
than this; that jurisprudence has become capable of truly scientific
treatment. He confirms his case by the parallel of the Political Economy
founded by Adam Smith and made scientific by Ricardo. I do not think
that Fitzjames was ever much interested in economical writings; and here
he is taking for granted the claims which were generally admitted under
the philosophical dynasty of J. S. Mill. Political Economy was supposed
to be a definitely constituted science; and the theory of jurisprudence,
which sprang from the same school and was indeed its other main
achievement, was entitled to the same rank. Fitzjames argues, or rather
takes for granted, that the claims of the economists to be strictly
scientific are not invalidated by the failure of their assumptions to
correspond exactly to concrete facts; and makes the same claim on behalf
of Austin. His view of Maine's work is determined by this. He of course
cordially admires his friend; but protests against the assumption by
which Maine is infected, that a history of the succession of opinions
can be equivalent to an examination of their value. Maine shows, for
ex