guese Government had not become an
instrument of British ambition; that it was not a question of putting
into execution in the territory of Mozambique conventions recently
concluded with England, but merely of profiting by stipulations agreed
upon in the treaty of 1891 between Great Britain and Portugal. President
Kruger was, therefore, informed that the legality of the incident was
not to be questioned at Pretoria.

[Footnote 20: Times Military History, Vol. IV, p. 364 ff.]

The consensus of opinion among European Powers was that the landing of
troops at Beira and the passage by rail to Rhodesia with the consent of
Portugal constituted a breach of neutrality on the part of the latter.
The opinion was freely expressed that the British Government not only
placed a strained interpretation upon the only basis for her action, the
treaty of 1891, but that even upon this interpretation she possessed no
real servitude over the territory used by her for warlike purposes. The
only claim of justification advanced by the British Government which
would appear at all tenable rests upon the statement of Calvo: "It may
be that a servitude of public order, or a treaty made antecedently to
the war, imposes on a neutral State the obligation of allowing the
passage of the troops of one belligerent." "In such a case," Calvo
concludes, "the fulfilment of the legal obligation cannot be regarded as
an assistance afforded to that belligerent and a violation of the duties
of neutrality."[21]

[Footnote 21: Baty, Int. Law in South Africa, p. 73, quoting Calvo. But
Calvo calls attention to the fact that this is his own "exception to the
general rule," in support of which he cites no authorities and only one
precedent--that of the passage of foreign troops across the Canton of
Schaffhausen in 1867 by virtue of a prior treaty between Switzerland and
the Grand Duchy of Baden. Obviously no general conclusion can be drawn
from the conduct of a neutralized state, such as Switzerland. The
general rule, not the exception, is sought in determining international
rights. Droit international, 3d Ed., III, Sec.2347.]

Basing his argument largely upon this authority, Mr. Baty asserts that
Calvo approves the granting of passage where this privilege has been
secured by previous treaty. But the following statement which he cites
from Calvo, taken in connection with the rule given above, would appear
to deny this conclusion: "During war neutrals may oppose, e