ven by force,
all attempts that a belligerent may make to use their territory, and
may, in particular, refuse one of the belligerents a passage for its
armies to attack the enemy; _so much the more so, inasmuch as the
neutral who should allow a passage of the troops of one belligerent
would be false to its character and would give the other just cause of
war."_[22]
[Footnote 22: Int. Law in South Africa, p. 73. This quotation is
slightly misleading, but even as used it clearly denies the English
claim.]
What Calvo says is: "Tous les publicistes sont d'accord pour admettre
que le territoire d'une nation constitue une veritable propriete ...
le territoire neutre doit etre a l'abri de toutes les entreprises des
belligerants de quelque nature qu'elles soient; les neutres ont le droit
incontestable de s'opposer par tous les moyens en leur pouvoir, meme par
la force des armes, a toutes les tentatives qu'un belligerant pourrait
faire pour user de leur territoire."[23] He also calls attention to the
fact that Grotius, Wolff and other authors held that a belligerent,
"dont la cause est juste peut, pour aller a la rencontre de son ennemi,
traverser avec ses armees le territoire d'une nation neutre."[24] But
his statement of the modern rule is conclusive: "Par contre, Heffter,
Hautefeuille, Manning et d'autres auteurs modernes se sont avec juste
raison eleves contre des principes dans lesquels ils entrevoient la
negation implicite des droits et des devoirs stricts de la neutralite. A
leur yeux, la nation neutre qui consent au passage des troupes de l'une
des parties belligerantes manque a son caractere et donne a l'autre
partie un juste motif de lui declarer la guerre."[25]
[Footnote 23: Calvo, Sec.2344.]
[Footnote 24: Ibid., Sec.2345.]
[Footnote 25: Ibid., Sec.2346.]
Mr. Baty, without reaching any definite conclusion in the matter, admits
that the point to be decided in any case is not so much the fact that
there is an antecedent treaty, as the nature of that treaty. He says,
"If it granted a real right of way of the nature of a right _in rem_
there is no reason why the way should be stopped against troops any more
than why a purchaser of territory should be debarred from using, it as a
base of military operations." But he points out, "If the treaty only
created a right _in personam_ the case is different." In the latter case
it is obvious that the power which claims the way depends entirely on
the promise of the te
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