s had been raised in
Rhodesia for the war but were employed outside the colony. It was
asserted that this fact had left the province in such an unprotected
state that, aside from the fear of a Boer invasion, a Kaffir uprising
was imminent.

Mr. Chamberlain had refused to send forces into Rhodesia in December
upon the ground that troops could not be spared. But it was finally
arranged to send five thousand mounted men, some of them to be enlisted
in Rhodesia and all of them to be furnished outside of England. Before
the end of January, 1899, a commander had been appointed from the
English army, and it was expected that the forces would be upon the
borders of Bechuanaland by the end of May.

Difficulty at once arose with reference to the right of passage of these
troops, military stores, and in fact a full equipment for warlike
purposes. There was not much choice of routes. Those through the
Transvaal and through Bechuanaland were closed. The only route left was
through the port of Beira. This course necessitated the passage of
belligerent troops across two hundred miles of neutral territory
controlled by Portugal as territorial sovereign. Beira, situated about
four hundred and fifty miles north of Lorenzo Marques, bears nearly the
same relation topographically to British Mashonaland and to British
Rhodesia that Delagoa Bay does to the Transvaal and the Orange Free
State. A railway nearing completion formed an almost continuous route
from Beira to Salisbury in Rhodesia, and once in the latter province
troops would be in a position to invade the Transvaal.

Under ordinary circumstances it would have been a distinct breach of
neutrality on the part of Portugal to allow the passage across her
territory of the troops of one of the belligerents, since the obvious
destination could only be the country of the other belligerent, with
whom she was on friendly terms. Portugal had granted to England in 1896
the right of passage for a field force to be used against the natives in
Mashonaland.[13] But that was a case of warfare against a savage tribe,
and was not to be considered as a reliable precedent for similar action
against a civilized State such as the South African Republic.

[Footnote 13: Times Military History of the War in South Africa, Vol. IV
p. 365]

The principles of the international law of modern times leave little or
no doubt as to the proper course for a neutral to follow in such a case.
Oppenheim says: "In co