oes to work very
cautiously, no more and no less than a link in the eternal chain of
development; a stage, beyond which he looks into a divinely appointed
kingdom of the future, that will no longer rest upon the pillars of
force and fear, which "contradict the consciousness of God, wherein
there will be no difference between governed and government." He
quickly disposes of the objection that men are not fit for such an
ideal State. "Once we have created conditions in accordance with the
divine will, the men for them will be there. If there was a paradise
for the first primitive man, why should there not be one for civilised
man of to-day? We only need to create it for ourselves; and once we
have gained entrance to it we shall not be driven out of it a second
time--we have had our warning. Of course the 'old Adam' must be left
outside." Of course! But Egidy forgets in the ardour of inspiration
that it is not so easy to leave the old Adam outside, and that his
assumption of a primitive paradise for mankind, for the _homme
sauvage_ of the "social contract," directly contradicts the theory of
evolution which he has just unhesitatingly accepted. He also
contradicts himself when he at first maintains that the "conditions in
accordance with the divine will" will produce men fitted for them, and
afterwards says: "Do not let us trouble about programmes and systems,
or modes of execution; only get the right men, and we need not trouble
ourselves about how to realise our proposals."

As may be seen, his "United Christianity" not only has a Socialist
side, but it is sheer Socialism, the main basis of which is moral and
intellectual self-consciousness. Egidy has certainly not drawn up a
definite programme, and could not draw it up; "since we are all at the
present moment, without exception, undergoing a thorough
transformation of 'the inner man,' it is more reasonable to defer
single efforts till the general consciousness has become enlightened
on essential points." Egidy can thus only open up "points of view" on
the social question, leaving everything else to the individual and to
natural evolution. Hence a definite social doctrine is excluded.

Thus, upon the question of property, he says that property is "not so
much the source as the logical consequence of the immature ideas of
human rights and duties which we still hold. With the progressive
transformation of our ideas generally, with the adoption of a totally
different view