dual is compelled
to take part in it when once formed, or to maintain it. When we
consider that every force must be set in action for some definite
purpose, the State or the sphere of society's force must be organised;
yet every individual must retain his natural right of deciding for
himself whether he will join the State and maintain it or not. If then
the State is legitimate as an agreement to defend one's self-ownership
against all attacks, there are sufficient reasons for creating such an
organisation and placing the exercise of the forces mentioned in its
hands, instead of keeping them in our hands as individuals.... I fully
admit that the right of exercising force in self-defence belongs to
the individual and is transferred by him to the State; but the moral
pressure on the individual to transfer this right is overwhelming. Who
of us would care to be judge and executioner at once in one's own
person? Who would wish to exercise Lynch law?[8] What is to be gained
thereby? It is not a question of right, for, as we have seen, the
individual, who may exercise force in self-defence, can also transfer
this exercise of his power, and if he can do this legally, is it not a
hundred times better if he also does so actually? I willingly admit
that, when it is solely a question of a group, even the group, as the
source of law, may, if it wishes, organise its own defence, and
isolate itself from the general organisation of other groups. But I do
not admit that the group can also separate itself, when the question
directly concerns other groups besides itself. I would not, for
example, allow a group the right to conduct its sewers to a certain
point in a stream, because this directly affects the interests of
other groups at other points of the stream. The first group must come
to an understanding with the other groups concerned; in other words,
it must enter into a common organisation with other groups. Or again:
group A decides to punish those who instigate to murder, while group B
is of opinion that one need not trouble about words, but only about
deeds. Such a difference of views and procedure is unimportant, so
long as the members of group A merely associate with one another; but
suppose a member of group B were to incite a person to murder a member
of group A, it is clear that we should be confronted by a civil war
between the two groups the moment that group A seeks to seize and
punish the instigator. It also happens that