his own troops was somewhat impaired. No leader
could make more skillful use of detachments. He would throw them out to
great distances, even when surrounded by superior and active forces, and
yet in no instance was one of them (commanded by a competent officer and
who obeyed instructions) overwhelmed or cut off. It very rarely happened
that they failed to accomplish the purposes for which they were
dispatched, or to rejoin the main body in time to assist in decisive
action. He could widely separate and apparently scatter his forces, and
yet maintain such a disposition of them as to have all well in hand.
When pushing into the enemy's lines he would send these detachments in
every direction, until it was impossible to conjecture his real
intentions--causing, generally, the shifting of troops from point to
point as each was threatened; until the one he wished to attack was
weakened, when he would strike at it like lightning.
He was a better strategist than tactician. He excelled in the arts which
enable a commander to make successful campaigns and gain advantages
without much fighting, rather than in skillful maneuvering on the field.
He knew how to thoroughly confuse and deceive an enemy, and induce in
him (as he desired) false confidence or undue caution; how to isolate
and persuade or compel him to surrender without giving battle; and he
could usually manage, although inferior to the aggregate of the hostile
forces around him, to be stronger or as strong at the point and moment
of encounter.
The tactics he preferred, when he chose to fight, were attempts at
surprise and a concentration of his strength for headlong dashing
attacks.
To this latter method there were some objections. These attacks were
made with a vigor, and inspired in the men a reckless enthusiasm, which
generally rendered them successful. But if the enemy was too strong, or
holding defensible positions, was resolute and stubborn in resistance,
and the first two or three rushes failed to drive him, the attack was
apt to fail altogether, and the reaction was correspondent to the energy
of the onset.
He did not display so much ability when operating immediately with the
army, as when upon detached service. He would not hesitate to remain for
days closely confronting the main forces of the enemy, keeping his
videttes constantly in sight of his cantonments, observing his every
movement, and attacking every detachment and foraging party which he
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