ine the
precise value of all that he heard. His quickness and accuracy, in this
respect, amounted almost to another sense; reports, which to others
appeared meager and unsatisfactory, and circumstances devoid of meaning
to all but himself, frequently afforded him a significant and lively
understanding of the matters which he wished to know.

He had another faculty which is very essential to military success,
indispensably necessary, at any rate, to a cavalry commander who acts
independently and at such distances from any base or support as he
almost constantly did. I believe the English term it, having "a good eye
for a country." It is the faculty of rapidly acquiring a correct idea of
the nature and peculiar features of any country in which military
operations are to be conducted. He neglected nothing that a close study
of maps and careful inquiry could furnish of this sort of knowledge, but
after a brief investigation or experience, he generally had a better
understanding of the subject than either map-makers or natives could
give him.

However imperfect might be his acquaintance with a country, it was
nearly impossible for a guide to deceive him. What he had once learned
in this respect he never forgot. A road once traveled was always
afterward familiar to him, with distances, localities and the adjacent
country. Thus, always having in his mind a perfect idea of the region
where he principally operated, he could move with as much facility and
confidence (when there) without maps and guides as with them. His
favorite strategy, in his important expeditions or "raids," was to place
himself by long and swift marches--moving sometimes for days and nights
without a halt except to feed the horses--in the very heart of the
territory where were the objects of his enterprise. He relied upon this
method to confuse if not to surprise his enemy, and prevent a
concentration of his forces. He would then strike right and left. He
rarely declined upon such expeditions to fight when advancing, for it
was his theory that then, a concentration of superior forces against him
was more difficult, and that the vigor of his enemy was to a certain
extent paralyzed by the celerity of his own movements and the mystery
which involved them. But after commencing his retreat, he would use
every effort and stratagem to avoid battle, fearing that while fighting
one enemy others might also overtake him, and believing that at such
times the morale of