inaccessible to Confederate troops.
But to have taken the army into Northern Kentucky, upon the supposition
that the unarmed population would arise and enable it to remain
there--in the face of the threatening dangers and the almost positive
certainty of instant battle--would have been a blind, unreasoning
daring, which had no place among the qualities of General Johnson. The
wisdom and prescience of the great commander were afterward so
abundantly demonstrated, that we may be pardoned for believing his
judgment right in this instance also.
In establishing his base at Bowlinggreen, he secured, as has been shown,
a line well adapted to enable him to assume the offensive so soon as his
army was sufficiently strong to do so with effect. The very fact of his
moving into Kentucky at all was a pledge and guarantee to the people of
his department, that, if sustained by them, he would keep the war out of
their territory, and encouraged his army to hope for an active, dashing
campaign. He placed himself where the more enterprising and determined
of the Kentucky rebels could join him, and he spared no effort, no
appeal, which could stimulate enlistment in his army among the young men
of Kentucky, or of the States of his department.
That his appeals were neglected was not only his, but the Confederacy's
deadly misfortune. Numerical weakness frustrated in September 1861, his
plan to appear before the people, not only of Northern Kentucky, but of
the Northwestern States, as the victor of a decisive battle, and, in the
following February, forced him to retreat from Kentucky altogether. The
first and most golden opportunity was lost; and the future history of
the war in the West, was a series of terrible reverses to the
Confederate arms, or of victories brilliant indeed, but, in the end,
fruitless.
The condition of the Confederate troops was far better, in many
respects, at this time, than at any subsequent period of the war.
There were, then, facilities and means for providing them with
necessaries and comforts which more latterly did not exist. Provisions
were abundant everywhere, and were regularly supplied.
The railroads, which were then, all in good repair and well provided
with rolling stock, afforded sure means of supplying the troops which
were stationed in those parts of the country through which they ran. The
numerous navigable streams also afforded facilities, and practically
shortened the routes of supply.
In
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