multaneously occupied.

Columbus was occupied by General Polk, as has been stated, on the 4th,
some days earlier.

It was generally believed that General Buckner, who, as has been already
stated, led the van, would have had no difficulty in capturing
Louisville had he pressed on. Very little doubt was entertained, then,
of the adequacy of his command, small as it was, to have taken the
place, and, I presume, no one doubts it now. An impression prevailed
that General Buckner was strongly in favor of continuing his advance to
Louisville, and that he urgently solicited permission to do so. But
whether it was suggested or not, it found no favor with General Johnson.
A plan to take and hold Louisville, without any provision for the
occupation of other portions of Kentucky up to the Ohio river, would
have been, to say the least, a very rash one, and at that time captures
with a view only to temporary occupation were not in fashion. To hold
the State, an army would have been required numerous enough to furnish
strong garrisons for Paducah and Smithland, at the mouths of the
Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, for the protection of the mouth of
Green river for Carrollton, at the mouth of Kentucky river, for
Louisville, Covington, and other points farther eastward. General
Johnson could not have held Kentucky two months after he had occupied
her northern territory (if he had taken possession of it) with the
forces which he had at his disposal. He would either have had to
establish the garrisons, which have been indicated, and provide the
supporting force, or he would have been compelled to adopt another plan,
perhaps more advisable, viz: to have organized three separate corps, one
for the western, one for the middle, and the third for the eastern
portion of the State, each charged with the defense of a certain length
of river line, and so disposed as to be readily concentrated, at short
notice, at any point upon it.

To properly carry into effect either plan, many more troops would have
been required than General Johnson had--it would have been folly to have
attempted either with his handful of men.

Another line in advance of that of the Green river, might have been
taken, which would have secured additional and very valuable territory.
General Johnson might have established one half of his army at
Muldraugh's Hill, thirty miles from Louisville, and upon the Louisville
and Nashville railroad, and the other half in the country