protecting
it had been driven off. Nashville might be taken by the victors. One of
the forts protecting the great water lines which led right into the
heart of his department, and away to the rear of his army, had been
taken. If the other fell the fate of Nashville was sealed, but far
worse, he would be inclosed at Bowlinggreen, should he remain there,
between three armies each much stronger than his own. If he lingered
around Nashville, he could not protect the city, but gave his enemy the
opportunity of cutting him off completely from the only territory whence
he could hope to obtain recruits, and of preventing his junction with
the reinforcements which he had ordered to his assistance. He did not
hesitate a moment.
Price and Van Dorn were ordered from Arkansas, Bragg was ordered from
Pensacola, all the available troops at New Orleans, and every point in
the department where troops were stationed, were called into the field,
and the concentration of all at Corinth, in Northern Mississippi, was
arranged. Here he would have every thing massed and in hand, and in his
rear would be no danger, nor indefensible line by which danger could
menace him. His adversaries on the contrary would be separated from each
other; rivers and all the perils of a hostile population would be
between them and safety, if they were defeated or forced to turn and
retreat; energy and promptness would enable him to strike them heavy
blows before they could unite; if every detail of his plan worked right,
he might hope to outnumber them at every collision.
This plan would require the evacuation of Columbus, even if the
occupation of New Madrid did not; but there was no longer any use of
holding Columbus, after a retreat to Mississippi had been decided upon.
Its garrison would help to swell the ranks of the army for the decisive
battle--and if that battle were won, territory far North of Columbus
would be gained. Therefore, braving censure and remonstrance more
general, energetic, and daring, than was ever encountered by any
Confederate officer, before or since, General Johnson turned his back
upon Kentucky and commenced the retreat which culminated in the battle
of Shiloh. When the dangers from which this retreat extricated him, the
favorable position in which it placed him for offensive operations, the
exact calculation of the proper time to turn retreat into attack, and
the electric rapidity and courage with which the latter was done--when
al
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