ofter language. Malcolm Laing, in noticing the fact,
contents himself by simply contrasting the indignation on the part of
the Scotch, which had been aroused by their recent sufferings, with
the quieter temper of the English, who had been less tried by the
pressure of actual persecution, and who were anxious to impart to
Revolution at least the colour of legitimate succession. And Sir James
Mackintosh, in his _Vindiciae Gallicae_, contents himself with simply
remarking that the 'absurd debates in the English Convention were
better cut short by the Parliament of Scotland, when they used the
correct and manly expression that James VII. _had forfeited the
throne_.' We are of opinion that the very different styles of the two
Conventions may be accounted for on the ground that, in the one
kingdom, the monarch, according to the genius of the constitution, was
regarded as incapable of committing wrong; whereas, in the other, he
was no less constitutionally regarded as equally peccable with any of
his subjects. A peccable monarch may _forfeit_ his throne; an
impeccable one can only _abdicate_ it. The argument must of course
depend on the soundness of Baillie's statement. Was the doctrine that
the king can do no wrong a Scottish doctrine at the time of the
Revolution, or was it not?

It was at least not a Scottish one in the days of Buchanan,--nor for a
century after, as we may learn very conclusively, not from Buchanan
himself, nor his followers--for the political doctrines of a school of
writers may be much at variance with those of their country--but from
the many Scottish controversialists on the antagonist side, who
entered the lists against both the master and his disciples. Buchanan
maintained, in his philosophical treatise, _De Jure Regni apud
Scotos_, that there are conditions by which the King of Scotland is
bound to his people, on the fulfilment of which the allegiance of the
people depends, and that 'it is lawful to depose, and even to punish
tyrants.' Knox, with the other worthies of the first Reformation, held
exactly the same doctrine. The _Lex Rex_ of Rutherford testifies
significantly to the fact that among the worthies of the second
Reformation it was not suffered to become obsolete. It takes a
prominent place in writings of the later Covenanters, such as the
_Hind let Loose_; and at the Revolution it received the practical
concurrence of the National Convention, and of the country generally.
Now the doctrine,