e' or 'apostatizing' be at all proper words
in reference to the _things_ which we have here described, what, we ask,
save the want either of weight or of exertion on the part of the
_represented_ bodies who complain of it, can be properly regarded as the
_cause_ of that apostasy? A representative Government, if the
represented be Episcopalian, will itself be officially Episcopalian; if
the represented be Papist, it will itself be officially Papist; if the
represented be Presbyterian, it will itself be officially Presbyterian;
if composed of all three together, the Government will bear an aggregate
average character; but if, on some crotchet, the Presbyterians withdraw
from the political field, while the others exert themselves in that
field to the utmost, it will be Popish and Episcopalian exclusively. But
for a result so undesirable--a result which, if Presbytery had been
formerly in the ascendant, might of course be called official
apostasy--it would be the Presbyterian constituency that would be to
blame, not the Government.

It will be seen that this view of the real state of _things_ was that
of Knox and Chalmers, and that they acted in due accordance with it.
We are told by the younger M'Crie, in his admirable _Sketches of
Scottish Church History_, 'that Knox and his brethren, perceiving that
the whole ecclesiastical property of the kingdom bade fair to be soon
swallowed up by the rapacity of the nobles, insisted that a
considerable portion of it should be reserved for the support of the
poor, the founding of universities and schools, and the maintenance of
an efficient ministry throughout the country. At last,' continues the
historian, 'after great difficulty, the Privy Council came to the
determination that the ecclesiastical revenues should be divided into
three parts,--that two of them should be given to the ejected prelates
during their lives, which afterwards reverted to the nobility, and
that the third part should be divided between the Court and the
Protestant ministry.'

'Well,' exclaimed Knox on hearing of this arrangement, 'if the end of
this order be happy, my judgment fails me. I see two parts freely
given to the devil, and the third must be divided between God and the
devil.' Strong words these. Here is a Government, according to Knox's
own statement of the case, giving five-sixths to the devil, and but a
remaining sixth to God. But does Knox on that account refuse God's
moiety? Does he set himself