ust stand the consequences,
whether they think in unison with himself or not. We, conceive, however,
that even those who differ from him most, would readily own, that to his
instructive disquisitions they were indebted for at least one half of
all that they know of philosophy.

In entering on an examination of the system of Dr Reid, we must ask
first of all, what is the great problem about which philosophers in all
ages have busied themselves most, and which consequently must have
engaged, and did engage, a large share of the attention of the champion
of Common Sense? We must also state the _fact_ which gives rise to the
problem of philosophy.

The perception of a material universe, as it is the most prominent fact
of cognition, so has it given rise to the problem which has been most
agitated by philosophers. This question does not relate to the existence
of the fact. The existence of the perception of matter is admitted on
all hands. It refers to the nature, or origin, or constitution of the
fact. Is the perception of matter simple and indivisible, or is it
composite and divisible? Is it the ultimate, or is it only the
penultimate, _datum_ of cognition? Is it a relation constituted by the
concurrence of a mental or subjective, and a material or objective
element,--or do we impose upon ourselves in regarding it as such? Is it
a state, or modification of the human mind? Is it an effect that can be
distinguished from its cause? Is it an event consequent on the presence
of real antecedent objects? These interrogations are somewhat varied in
their form, but each of them embodies the whole point at issue, each of
them contains the cardinal question of philosophy. The perception of
matter is the admitted fact. The _character_ of this fact--that is the
point which speculation undertakes to canvass, and endeavours to
decipher.

Another form in which the question may be put is this: We all believe in
the existence of matter--but what _kind_ of matter do we believe in the
existence of? matter _per se_, or matter _cum perceptione_? If the
former--this implies that the given fact (the perception of matter) is
compound and submits to analysis; if the latter--this implies that it is
simple and defies partition.

Opposite answers to this question are returned by psychology and
metaphysics. In the estimation of metaphysic, the perception of matter
is the absolutely elementary in cognition, the _ne plus ultra_ of
thought. Reason ca