o not blame him for this: he simply
missed his way at the outset. Representationism could not possibly be
avoided, neither could intuitionism be possibly fallen in with, on the
analytic road which he took.

But we have not yet done with the consideration of the psychological or
analytic doctrine of perception. We proceed to examine the entanglements
in which reason gets involved when she accepts the perception of matter
not in its natural and indissoluble unity, but as analysed by
philosophers into a mental and a material factor. We have still an eye
to Dr Reid. He came to the rescue of reason--how did it fare with him in
the struggle?

The analysis so often referred to affords a starting point, as has been
shown, to representationism: it is also the tap-root of scepticism and
idealism. These four things hang together in an inevitable sequence.
Scepticism and idealism dog representationism, and representationism
dogs the analysis of the perception of matter, just as obstinately as
substance is dogged by shadow. More explicitly stated, the order in
which they move is this:--The analysis divides the perception of matter
into perception and matter--two separate things. Upon this,
representationism declares, that the perception is the proximate and
that the matter is the remote object of the mind. Then scepticism
declares, that the existence of the matter which has been separated from
the perception is problematical, because it is not the direct object of
consciousness, and is consequently hypothetical. And, last of all,
idealism takes up the ball and declares, that this hypothetical matter
is not only problematical, but that it is non-existent. These are the
perplexities which rise up to embarrass reason whenever she is weak
enough to accept from philosophers their analysis of the perception of
matter. They are only the just punishment of her infatuated facility.
But what has Reid done to extricate reason from her embarrassments?

We must remember that Reid commenced with analysis, and that
consequently he embraced representationism,--in its spirit, if not
positively in its letter. But how did he evade the fangs of scepticism
and idealism--to say nothing of destroying--these sleuth-hounds which on
this road were sure to be down upon his track the moment they got wind
of him? We put the question in a less figurative form,--When scepticism
and idealism doubted or denied the independent existence of matter, how
did Reid vi