ology. He and therepresentationists,
moreover, agree in hold ing that the latter is the object of belief rather
than of knowledge.

The merits of Dr Reid, then, as a reformer of philosophy, amount in our
opinion to this:--he was among the first[23] to _say_ and to _write_
that the representative theory of perception was false and erroneous,
and was the fountainhead of scepticism and idealism. But this admission
of his merits must be accompanied by the qualification that he adopted,
as the basis of his philosophy, a principle which rendered nugatory all
his protestations. It is of no use to disclaim a conclusion if we accept
the premises which inevitably lead to it. Dr Reid disclaimed the
representative theory, but he embraced its premises, and thus he
virtually ratified the conclusions of the very system which he
clamourously denounced. In his language, he is opposed to
representationism, but in his doctrine, he lends it the strongest
support, by accepting as the foundation of his philosophy an analysis of
the perception of matter.

In regard to the _second_ end which Dr Reid is supposed to have
overtaken,--the establishment of a doctrine of intuitive as opposed to a
doctrine of representative perception, it is unnecessary to say much. If
we have proved him to be a representationist, he cannot be held to be an
intuitionist. Indeed, a doctrine of intuitive perception is a sheer
impossibility upon his principles. A doctrine of intuition implies that
the mind in perceiving matter has only one, namely, a proximate object.
But the analysis of the perception of matter yields as its result, a
remote as well as a proximate object. The proximate object is the
perception--the remote object is the reality. And thus the analysis of
the given fact necessarily renders abortive every endeavour to construct
a doctrine of intuitive perception. The attempt _must_ end in
representationism. The only basis for a doctrine of intuitive perception
which will never give way, is a resolute forbearance from all analysis
of the fact. Do not tamper with it, and you are safe.

Such is the judgment which we are reluctantly compelled to pronounce on
the philosophy of Dr Reid in reference to its two cardinal claims--the
refutation of the ideal theory, and the establishment of a truer
doctrine--a doctrine of intuitive perception. In neither of these
undertakings do we think that he has succeeded, and we have exhibited
the grounds of our opinion. We d