o meaning,--they have neither facts
nor thoughts corresponding to them, when taken out of correlation to
each other. The word "perception" must be supplemented (mentally at
least) by the words "of matter," before it has any kind of sense--before
it denotes any thing that exists; and in like manner the word "matter"
must be mentally supplemented by the words "perception of," before it
has any kind of sense, or denotes any real existence. The psychologist
would think it absurd if any one were to maintain that there is one
separate existence in nature corresponding to the syllable _mat-_, and
another separate existence corresponding to the syllable _ter_--the
component syllables of the word "matter." In the estimation of the
metaphysician, it is just as ridiculous to suppose that there is an
existing fact or modification in us corresponding to the three syllables
_perception_, and a fact or existence in nature corresponding to the two
syllables _matter_. The word "perception" is merely part of a word
which, for convenience' sake, is allowed to represent the whole word;
and so is the word "matter." The word "perception-of-matter" is always
the one total word--the word to the mind,--and the existence which this
word denotes is a totally objective existence.

But in these remarks we are reiterating (we hope, however, that we are
also enforcing) our previous arguments. No power of the mind can divide
into two facts, or two existences, or two thoughts, that one prominent
fact which stands forth in its integrity as the perception-of-matter.
Despite, then, the misleading construction of language--despite the
plausible artifices of psychology, we must just accept this fact as we
find it,--that is, we must accept it indissoluble and entire, and we
must keep it indissoluble and entire. We have seen what psychology
brought us to by tampering with it, under the pretence of a spurious,
because impracticable analysis.

We proceed to exhibit the grounds upon which the metaphysician claims
for the perception of matter a totally objective existence. The question
may be stated thus: Where are we to place this _datum_? in our minds or
_out of_ our minds? We cannot place part of it in our own minds, and
part of it out of our minds, for it has been proved to be not subject to
partition. Whereever we place it, then, there must we place it whole and
undivided. Has the perception of matter, then, its proper location in
the human mind, or has it