ways going on together, there is in the
present phase of the world a drift in favor of evolution. In the first
edition of "First Principles" an evolutive change in anything was
described as the passage of it from a state of indefinite incoherent
homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity. The existence of a
drift in this direction in everything Mr. Spencer proves, both by a
survey of facts, and by deducing it from certain laws of the elementary
type, which he severally names "the instability of the homogeneous,"
"the multiplication of effects," "segregation," and "equilibration."
The two former insure the heterogeneity, while "segregation" brings
about the definiteness and coherence, and "equilibration" arrests the
process, and determines when dissolutive changes shall begin.

The whole panorama is resplendent for variety and inclusiveness, and
has aroused an admiration for philosophy in minds that never admired
philosophy before. Like Descartes in earlier days, Spencer aims at a
purely mechanical explanation of Nature. The knowable universe is
nothing but matter and motion, and its history is nothing but the
"redistribution" of these entities. The value of such an explanation
for scientific purposes depends altogether on how consistent and exact
it is. Every "thing" must be interpreted as a "configuration," every
"event" as a change of configuration, every predicate ascribed must be
of a geometrical sort. Measured by these requirements of mechanics
Spencer's attempt has lamentably failed. His terms are vagueness and
ambiguity incarnate, and he seems incapable of keeping the mechanical
point of view in mind for five pages consecutively.

"Definite," for example, is hardly a physical idea at all. Every
motion and every arrangement of matter is definitely what it is,--a fog
or an irregular scrawl, as much so as a billiard ball or a straight
line. Spencer means by definiteness in a thing any character that
makes it arrest our attention, and forces us to distinguish it from
other things. The word with him has a human, not a physical
connotation. Definite things, in his book, finally appear merely as
_things that men have made separate names for_, so that there is hardly
a pretence of the mechanical view being kept. Of course names increase
as human history proceeds, so "definiteness" in things must necessarily
more and more evolve.

"Coherent," again. This has the definite mechanical meaning of
resist