ything be more
open to observation than what passes in a man's own consciousness?
Why, then, should the science of psychology lag behind? and why these
endless disputes as to whether it can really be treated as a "natural
science" at all?
Again. May we assume that, because certain disciplines have taken a
position of relative independence, therefore all the rest of the field
will surely come to be divided up in the same way, and that there will
be many special sciences, but no such thing as philosophy? It is hasty
to assume this on no better evidence than that which has so far been
presented. Before making up one's mind upon this point, one should
take a careful look at the problems with which the philosopher occupies
himself.
A complete answer to the questions raised above can only be given in
the course of the book, where the main problems of philosophy are
discussed, and the several philosophical sciences are taken up and
examined. But I may say, in anticipation, as much as this:--
(1) Philosophy is reflective knowledge. What is meant by reflective
knowledge will be explained at length in the next chapter.
(2) The sciences which are grouped together as philosophical are those
in which we are forced back upon the problems of reflective thought,
and cannot simply put them aside.
(3) The peculiar difficulties of reflective thought may account for the
fact that these sciences are, more than others, a field in which we may
expect to find disputes and differences of opinion.
(4) We need not be afraid that the whole field of human knowledge will
come to be so divided up into special sciences that philosophy will
disappear. The problems with which the philosopher occupies himself
are real problems, which present themselves unavoidably to the
thoughtful mind, and it is not convenient to divide these up among the
several sciences. This will become clearer as we proceed.
[1] "First Principles," Part II, section 37.
CHAPTER II
COMMON THOUGHT, SCIENCE, AND REFLECTIVE THOUGHT
7. COMMON THOUGHT.--Those who have given little attention to the study
of the human mind are apt to suppose that, when the infant opens its
eyes upon the new world of objects surrounding its small body, it sees
things much as they do themselves. They are ready to admit that it
does not know much _about_ things, but it strikes them as absurd for
any one to go so far as to say that it does not see things--the things
out th
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