_ego_, we may certainly affirm that the
world is in the _ego_, but does it sound sensible to say that the _ego_
is somewhere in the world?
(2) If all external things are really inside the mind, and are only
"projected" outwards, of course our own bodies, sense-organs, nerves,
and brains, are really inside and are merely projected outwards. Now,
do the sense-impressions of which everything is to be constructed "come
flowing in" along these nerves that are really inside?
(3) Can we say, when a nerve lies entirely within the mind or _ego_,
that this same mind or _ego_ is nearer to one end of the nerve than it
is to the other? How shall we picture to ourselves "the conscious
_ego_ of each one of us seated at the brain terminals of the sensory
nerves"? How can the _ego_ place the whole of itself at the end of a
nerve which it has constructed within itself? And why is it more
difficult for it to get to one end of a nerve like this than it is to
get to the other?
(4) Why should the thing "at the other end of the nerve" remain unknown
and unknowable? Since the nerve is entirely in the mind, is purely a
mental construct, can anything whatever be at the end of it without
being in the mind? And if the thing in question is not in the mind,
how are we going to prove that it is any nearer to one end of a nerve
which is inside the mind than it is to the other? If it may really be
said to be at the end of the nerve, why may we not know it quite as
well as we do the end of the nerve, or any other mental construct?
It must be clear to the careful reader of Professor Pearson's
paragraphs, that he does not confine himself strictly to the world of
mere "projections," to an outer world which is really _inner_. If he
did this, the distinction between inner and outer would disappear. Let
us consider for a moment the imprisoned clerk. He is in a telephone
exchange, about him are wires and subscribers. He gets only sounds and
must build up his whole universe of things out of sounds. Now we are
supposing him to be in a telephone exchange, to be receiving messages,
to be building up a world out of these messages. Do we for a moment
think of him as building up, out of the messages which came along the
wires, those identical wires which carried the messages and the
subscribers which sent them? Never! we distinguish between the
exchange, with its wires and subscribers, and the messages received and
worked up into a world. In pi
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