hings without him.
Now, the notions of the plain man on such matters as these are not very
clear, and what he says about sensations and things is not always
edifying. But it is clear that he feels strongly that the man who
would identify them is obliterating a distinction to which his
experience testifies unequivocally. We must not hastily disregard his
protest. He is sometimes right in his feeling that things are not
identical, even when he cannot prove it.
In the second place, I remark that, in this instance, the plain man is
in the right, and can be shown to be in the right. "Things" are not
groups of sensations. The distinction between them will be explained
in the next section.
17. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SENSATIONS AND "THINGS"--Suppose that I
stand in my study and look at the fire in the grate. I am experiencing
sensations, and am not busied merely with an imaginary fire. But may
my whole experience of the fire be summed up as an experience of
sensations and their changes? Let us see.
If I shut my eyes, the fire disappears. Does any one suppose that the
fire has been annihilated? No. We say, I no longer see it, but
nothing has happened to the fire.
Again, I may keep my eyes open, and simply turn my head. The fire
disappears once more. Does any one suppose that my turning my head has
done anything to the fire? We say unhesitatingly, my sensations have
changed, but the fire has remained as it was.
Still, again, I may withdraw from the fire. Its heat seems to be
diminished. Has the fire really grown less hot? And if I could
withdraw to a sufficient distance, I know that the fire would appear to
me smaller and less bright. Could I get far enough away to make it
seem the faintest speck in the field of vision, would I be tempted to
claim that the fire shrunk and grew faint merely because I walked away
from it? Surely not.
Now, suppose that I stand on the same spot and look at the fire without
turning my head. The stick at which I am gazing catches the flame,
blazes up, turns red, and finally falls together, a little mass of gray
ashes. Shall I describe this by saying that my sensations have
changed, or may I say that the fire itself has changed? The plain man
and the philosopher alike use the latter expression in such a case as
this.
Let us take another illustration. I walk towards the distant house on
the plain before me. What I see as my goal seems to grow larger and
brighte
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