e enumeration of those
activities of the soul of man whose analogies we also find in the animal
world, but rather in the answer to the question as to how that entirely new
manifestation, self-consciousness and moral self-determination, came into
existence or could have originated. This question is the more decidedly the
central point of the investigation, since this new form, when once in
existence, has for its object not only what already appears in the life of
the soul of animals, but also receives a new object, which can only be an
object of self-consciousness and of moral self-determination, and not of
mere consciousness and instinctive life. These new objects are the ideas
leading up to the conception of God and moral ideals.

Now this very question as to the origin of self-consciousness and of free
moral self-determination is wholly misjudged as to its importance, and
given remarkably little attention by those evolutionists who are well
versed in the realm of natural science. The question as to the origin of
self-consciousness is either entirely ignored--as if self-consciousness
must originate wholly by itself, if only those first steps of an
intellectual and social life which the animal world also shows, are once
present and properly developed--or the solution is put aside with the most
superficial analogies. The question regarding free moral
self-determination, on the other hand, is either likewise ignored, and for
the same reasons, or it is supposed that it must fail of itself, if {118}
only this self-determination is explained in a deterministic way.

It is true, Darwin devotes several chapters of his work, "Descent of Man,"
to a comparison of the intellectual powers of man with those of animals,
and these chapters are full of the most interesting facts and comparisons;
but although his work comprises two volumes, he devotes to the origin of
self-consciousness, individuality, abstraction, general ideas, etc., only a
single page, and justifies his brief treatment with the assertion that the
attempt at discussing these higher faculties is useless, because hardly two
authors agree in their definitions of these terms. What he says about
self-consciousness is really contained in two sentences, namely: "But how
can we feel sure that an old dog with an excellent memory and some power of
imagination, as shown by his dreams, never reflects on his past pleasures
or pains in the chase? This would be a form of self-conscio