ion in regard to teleology; compare below Part
Second, Book I, Chapt. III, Sec. 1.

Finally, we have to say a word concerning the _name_ which the
anti-teleological view of the world gives to itself: the name "_monism_."
The view of the world which monism gives us, seems hardly comprehensible;
and {178} just as little does the name which it gives itself, seem
justifiable.

If this name is to indicate only a maxim of _investigation_--the directive
which scientific investigation has to take, in order to reach more general
points of view--we could declare ourselves in full accord with it. All
investigation strives after a unity of principle; this impulse is a
scientific leading motive of our nature. Besides the absolute limits of our
knowledge, there are still enough relative and provisory limits to it; and
there also are enough low points of view, mistakes, and imperfections in
science, to justify us when we expressly form and establish monism as a
maxim of scientific investigation. All those theories and points of view
need such a spur and corrective, which are hastily satisfied with a
dualistic or a still farther expanded limit of our knowledge. Among them we
rank in theology the antique heathenish dualism which separates God and the
world in such a way that God is but the architect of the eternal matter,
existing independently of God; and also the modern deistic dualism which
considers only the elements, principles, and beginning of the world, as
dependent on God, but not the entire course of their developments as a
whole and in detail. In philosophy, taken in a narrower sense, we reckon
with them the one-sided atomism which can no longer find the connecting
link between the single elements of the world, or the one-sided assertion
of realism or idealism, since at this time all views of the world which win
acceptance from the present generation claim the praise of showing the
reconciliation and higher unity of realism and idealism. In anthropology,
there belongs to them {179} such a treatment of psychology and physiology,
that the one science does not trouble itself about the other, and the
investigation does not seek or keep in mind that which is common to both,
or that which is higher and superior to them; and in all natural sciences,
every mode of investigation belongs to them, where the single science
retains no sympathy with all other sciences and with the principles of all
scientific investigation. In regard to th