uld have fallen. He himself has said that he might have waited
until the Zulus actually made their threatened murderous raid. That
might have been Macchiavelian statecraft, but it would not have been
humanity; and there was nothing in the attitude of the Boer leaders
at the time of the annexation which foreshadowed the fierce and
determined opposition which afterwards developed. The fact seems to
be that the people of the Transvaal were either in favour of the
annexation, or were overpowered and dazed by the hopelessness of the
Republic's outlook; and they passively assented to the action of Sir
Theophilus Shepstone and his twenty-five policemen. The Boers were
quite unable to pay the taxes necessary to self-government and the
prosecution of the Kaffir wars. The Treasury was empty--save for the
much-quoted 12s. 6d. The Government L1 bluebacks were selling at 1s.
Civil servants' salaries were months in arrear. The President
himself--the excitable, unstable, visionary, but truly enlightened
and patriotic Burgers--had not only drawn no salary, but had expended
his private fortune, and incurred a very heavy liability, in the
prosecution of the unsuccessful Secocoeni war. No amount of _ex post
facto_ evidence as to the supposed feelings and opinions of the Boers
can alter a single one of the very serious facts which, taken
together, seemed to Sir Theophilus to justify the annexation. But it
all comes down to this: If the passive acquiescence in the annexation
coincided strangely with the Republic's failure to defeat its enemies
and pay its debts, it is no whit less odd that Lord Carnarvon's
anxiety for the Republic's safety synchronized with his attempt to
confederate South Africa.
The real mistakes of the British Government began _after_ the
annexation. The failure to fulfil promises; the deviation from old
ways of government; the appointment of unsuitable officials, who did
not understand the people or their language; the neglect to convene
the Volksraad or to hold fresh elections, as definitely promised;
the establishment of personal rule by military men, who treated the
Boers with harshness and contempt, and would make no allowance for
their simple, old-fashioned ways, their deep-seated prejudices, and,
if you like, their stupid opposition to modern ideas: these things
and others caused great dissatisfaction, and gave ample material for
the nucleus of irreconcilables to work with.
During the occupation period Mr. Kru
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