ot blind us to the truth. Even the
psychologist tends in his description of religious phenomena to single
out and emphasize what he calls a _typical_ religious experience. And
the same applies to the idealist's treatment of the matter.[54:1]
Religion, he reasons, is essentially a development of which the true
meaning can be seen only in the higher stages. The primitive religion is
therefore only implicit religion. But lower stages cannot be regarded as
belonging to a single development with higher stages, if there be not
some actual promise of the later in the earlier, or some element which
endures throughout. It is unavoidable, then, to assume that in dealing
with religion we are dealing with a specific and definable experience.

[Sidenote: The Profitableness of Defining Religion.]

Sect. 16. The profitableness of undertaking such a definition is another
matter. It may well be that in so human and practical an affair as
religion, definition is peculiarly inappropriate. But is there not a
human and practical value in the very defining of religion? Is there not
a demand for it in the peculiar relation that exists between religion
and the progress of enlightenment? Religion associates itself with the
habits of society. The progress of enlightenment means that more or less
all the time, and very profoundly at certain critical times, society
must change its habits. The consequence is that religion is likely to be
abandoned with the old habits. The need of a new religion is therefore a
chronic one. The reformer in religion, or the man who wishes to be both
enlightened and religious, is chiefly occupied with the problem of
disentangling religion pure and undefiled from definite discredited
practices and opinions. And the solution of the problem turns upon some
apprehension of the essence of religion. There is a large amount of
necessary and unnecessary tragedy due to the extrinsic connection
between ideas and certain modes of their expression. There can be no
more serious and urgent duty than that of expressing as directly, and so
as truly as possible, the great permanent human concerns. The men to
whom educational reform has been largely due have been the men who have
remembered for their fellows what this whole business of education is
after all for. Comenius and Pestalozzi served society by stripping
educational activity of its historical and institutional accessories,
and laying bare the genuine human need that these are