n was hardly marked
by his usual force of argument. He was hampered by the impossibility of
denying either the existence of the societies which the committee and
the minister had mentioned, or the dangerous character of some of their
designs; but he objected to the measures of repression which were
proposed, partly on the absence of all attempts at concealment on the
part of the promoters of these societies, partly on the contemptible
character of the Convention which it was designed to summon, and the
impossibility that such an assembly should have the slightest influence.
He even made their avowed hostility to the constitution a plea for a
panegyric on that constitution, and on the loyal attachment to it
evinced by the vast majority of the people; and from that he proceeded
to found a fresh argument against the proposed measure, contending that
it made a fatal inroad on that very constitution which was so highly
valued by the whole nation. He described it as a measure "of infinitely
greater mischief than that which it proposed to remedy, since it would
give the executive authority absolute power over the personal liberty of
every individual in the kingdom." He did not deny that a similar measure
had been enacted under William III., again in 1715, and again in 1745;
but he contended that "the present peril bore no resemblance to the
dangers of those times. This measure went to overturn the very
corner-stone of the constitution, and if it passed, there was an end of
the constitution of England." The bill was passed in both Houses by very
large majorities.[124] It was originally enacted for six months only,
but was from time to time renewed till the end of the century.

If we take a general survey of all these measures together, as parts of
one great defensive scheme for the preservation of the public
tranquillity and the general safety of the empire, it may, probably, be
thought that, though undoubtedly suspensions of the constitution, they
are not open to the charge of being unconstitutional, since they were
enacted, not only for the welfare of the people, but with their consent
and concurrence, legitimately signified by their representatives in
Parliament. It is scarcely consistent with sound reason to contend that
the _habeas corpus_, which had been enacted by Parliament, could not be
suspended by the authority which had enacted it; that the constitution,
which exists for the benefit of the people, could not be suspen