of State
might order any suspected foreigner to quit the kingdom instantly.
The act was to be in operation for twelve months, and Lord Grenville, in
introducing it, though he admitted it to be a measure of "rather a novel
nature," explained at the same time that it was so far from being new in
the powers which it gave, that Magna Charta distinctly recognized "the
power and right of the crown to prevent foreigners from entering or
residing within the realm." All that was really new was the defining of
the manner in which that power should be exercised, since it had been so
rarely needed that doubts might exist as to the proper mode of putting
it in action. The bill, which was adopted in both Houses by large
majorities, is remarkable, among other circumstances, from the fact that
its discussion furnished the first instance of a public display of the
difference between the two sections of the Opposition, subsequently
described by Burke in one of his most celebrated pamphlets as the Old
and New Whigs; those whom he called the Old Whigs (the Duke of Portland,
Sir Gilbert Elliott, Mr. Windham, not to mention Burke himself)
earnestly supporting it, while Lord Lansdowne, Mr. Fox, Mr. Sheridan,
and Mr. Grey resisted it with equal zeal. Lord Lansdowne took the ground
that it was a suspension of the _Habeas Corpus_ Act; while Fox and Grey
denounced it, in more general terms, as a measure "utterly
irreconcilable with the principles of the constitution," Mr. Grey
apparently referring chiefly to the power given by the bill to the
Secretary of State to send any foreigners from the country, which he
described as "making the bill a measure of oppression, giving power for
the exercise of which no man was responsible." Sir Gilbert Elliott's
answer was singularly ingenious. He did not deny that the bill conferred
additional power on the crown, though not more than was justified by
existing circumstances; but he maintained that the right of giving
extraordinary powers to the crown on occasions was so far from being
inconsistent with the principles of the constitution, that to grant
extraordinary powers in extraordinary emergencies was a part of it
essential to the character of a free government. If such powers were at
all times possessed by the crown, its authority would be too great for a
free government to co-exist with it; but if such could not be at times
conferred on the crown, its authority would be too small for its own
safety or t
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