approximated a
union of equals, and in theory it was entirely such. *
* By the Articles of Confederation Congress itself was made
"the last resort of all disputes and differences...between
two or more States concerning boundary, jurisdiction, or any
other cause whatever." It was also authorized to appoint
"courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on
the high seas" and "for receiving and determining finally
appeals in all cases of capture." But even before the
Articles had gone into operation, Congress had, as early as
1779, established a tribunal for such appeals, the old Court
of Appeals in Cases of Capture. Thus at the very outset, and
at a time when the doctrine of state sovereignty was
dominant, the practice of appeals from state courts to a
supreme national tribunal was employed, albeit within a
restricted sphere. Yet it is less easy to admit that the
Court of Appeals was, as has been contended by one
distinguished authority, "not simply the predecessor but one
of the origins of the Supreme Court of the United States."
The Supreme Court is the creation of the Constitution
itself; it is the final interpreter of the law in every
field of national power; and its decrees are carried into
effect by the force and authority of the Government of which
it is one of the three coordinate branches. That earlier
tribunal, the Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture, was, on
the other hand, a purely legislative creation; its
jurisdiction was confined to a single field, and that of
importance only in time of war; and the enforcement of its
decisions rested with the state governments.
In the Federal Convention of 1787 the idea of state coercion required
little discussion; for the members were soon convinced that it involved
an impracticable, illogical, and unjust principle. The prevailing
view was voiced by Oliver Ellsworth before the Connecticut ratifying
convention: "We see how necessary for Union is a coercive principle.
No man pretends to the contrary.... The only question is, shall it be
a coercion of law or a coercion of arms? There is no other possible
alternative. Where will those who oppose a coercion of law come out?...
A necessary consequence of their principles is a war of the States one
against the other. I am for coercion by law, that coercion which acts
only upon
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