acts of Congress and should
therefore be as secure as possible from legislative molestation.
The repeal of this Act was voted by a strict party majority and was
reinforced by a provision postponing the next session of the Supreme
Court until the following February. The Republican leaders evidently
hoped that by that time all disposition to test the validity of
the Repealing Act in the Court would have passed. But by this very
precaution they implied a recognition of the doctrine of judicial review
and the whole trend of the debate abundantly confirmed this implication.
Breckinridge, Randolph, and Giles, it is true, scouted the claim made
for the courts as "unheard-of doctrine," and as "mockery of the high
powers of legislation"; but the rank and file of their followers,
with the excesses of the French Revolution a recent memory and a
"consolidated government" a recent fear, were not to be seduced from
what they clearly regarded as established doctrine. Moreover, when it
came to legislation concerning the Supreme Court, the majority of the
Republicans again displayed genuine moderation, for, thrusting aside
an obvious temptation to swamp that tribunal with additional judges of
their own creed, they merely restored it to its original size under the
Act of 1789.
Nevertheless the most significant aspect in the repeal of the Act of the
13th of February was the fact itself. The Republicans had not shown
a more flagrant partisanism in effecting this repeal than had the
Federalists in originally enacting the measure which was now at an end.
Though the Federalists had sinned first, the fact nevertheless remained
that in realizing their purpose the Republican majority had established
a precedent which threatened to make of the lower Federal Judiciary the
merest cat's-paw of party convenience. The attitude of the Republican
leaders was even more menacing, for it touched the security of the
Supreme Court itself in the enjoyment of its highest prerogative and so
imperiled the unity of the nation. Beyond any doubt the moment was now
at hand when the Court must prove to its supporters that it was still
worth defending and to all that the Constitution had an authorized final
interpreter. Marshall's first constitutional case was that of Marbury
vs. Madison. * The facts of this famous litigation are simple. On March
2, 1801, William Marbury had been nominated by President Adams to the
office of Justice of the Peace in the District of
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