viality was never repeated after he was appointed
Chief Justice; and as to his unstudious habits, therein perhaps lay one
of the causes contributing to his achievement. Both as attorney and as
judge, he preferred the quest of broad, underlying principles, and, with
plenty of time for recuperation from each exertion, he was able to bring
to each successive task undiminished vitality and unclouded attention.
What the author of the "Leviathan" remarks of himself may well be
repeated of Marshall--that he made more use of his brains than of his
bookshelves and that, if he had read as much as most men, he would have
been as ignorant as they.

That Marshall was one of the leading members of his profession in
Virginia, the most recent biographical researches unmistakably prove.
"From 1790 until his election to Congress nine years later," Albert J.
Beveridge * writes, "Marshall argued 113 cases decided by the court
of appeals of Virginia.... He appeared during this time in practically
every important cause heard and determined by the supreme tribunal of
the State." Practically all this litigation concerned property rights,
and much of it was exceedingly intricate. Marshall's biographer also
points out the interesting fact that "whenever there was more than
one attorney for the client who retained Marshall, the latter almost
invariably was retained to make the closing argument." He was thus able
to make good any lack of knowledge of the technical issues involved
as well as to bring his great debating powers to bear with the best
advantage.

* "The Life of John Marshall," vol. II, p. 177.

Meanwhile Marshall was also rising into political prominence. From
the first a supporter of Washington's Administration, he was gradually
thrust into the position of Federalist leader in Virginia. In 1794 he
declined the post of Attorney-General, which Washington had offered him.
In the following year he became involved in the acrimonious struggle
over the Jay Treaty with Great Britain, and both in the Legislature and
before meetings of citizens defended the treaty so aggressively that its
opponents were finally forced to abandon their contention that it was
unconstitutional and to content themselves with a simple denial that it
was expedient. Early in 1796 Marshall made his first appearance before
the Supreme Court, in the case of Ware vs. Hylton. The fame of his
defense of "the British Treaty" during the previous year had preceded
him,