ination
most have to be talking of the concerns and behaviour of their neighbour.

But since it is impossible that this subject should be wholly excluded
conversation; and since it is necessary that the characters of men should
be known: the next thing is that it is a matter of importance what is
said; and, therefore, that we should be religiously scrupulous and exact
to say nothing, either good or bad, but what is true. I put it thus,
because it is in reality of as great importance to the good of society,
that the characters of bad men should be known, as that the characters of
good men should. People who are given to scandal and detraction may
indeed make an ill-use of this observation; but truths, which are of
service towards regulating our conduct, are not to be disowned, or even
concealed, because a bad use may be made of them. This however would be
effectually prevented if these two things were attended to. First, That,
though it is equally of bad consequence to society that men should have
either good or ill characters which they do not deserve; yet, when you
say somewhat good of a man which he does not deserve, there is no wrong
done him in particular; whereas, when you say evil of a man which he does
not deserve, here is a direct formal injury, a real piece of injustice
done him. This therefore makes a wide difference; and gives us, in point
of virtue, much greater latitude in speaking well than ill of others.
Secondly, A good man is friendly to his fellow-creatures, and a lover of
mankind; and so will, upon every occasion, and often without any, say all
the good he can of everybody; but, so far as he is a good man, will never
be disposed to speak evil of any, unless there be some other reason for
it, besides, barely that it is true. If he be charged with having given
an ill character, he will scarce think it a sufficient justification of
himself to say it was a true one, unless he can also give some further
account how he came to do so: a just indignation against particular
instances of villainy, where they are great and scandalous; or to prevent
an innocent man from being deceived and betrayed, when he has great trust
and confidence in one who does not deserve it. Justice must be done to
every part of a subject when we are considering it. If there be a man,
who bears a fair character in the world, whom yet we know to be without
faith or honesty, to be really an ill man; it must be allowed in general
th