seems no other reason to suspect that there is any such peculiar
contrariety, but only that the course of action which benevolence leads
to has a more direct tendency to promote the good of others, than that
course of action which love of reputation suppose, or any other
particular affection leads to. But that any affection tends to the
happiness of another does not hinder its tending to one's own happiness
too. That others enjoy the benefit of the air and the light of the sun
does not hinder but that these are as much one's own private advantage
now as they would be if we had the property of them exclusive of all
others. So a pursuit which tends to promote the good of another, yet may
have as great tendency to promote private interest, as a pursuit which
does not tend to the good of another at all, or which is mischievous to
him. All particular affections whatever, resentment, benevolence, love
of arts, equally lead to a course of action for their own gratification;
_i.e._, the gratification of ourselves; and the gratification of each
gives delight: so far, then, it is manifest they have all the same
respect to private interest. Now take into consideration, further,
concerning these three pursuits, that the end of the first is the harm,
of the second, the good of another, of the last, somewhat indifferent;
and is there any necessity that these additional considerations should
alter the respect, which we before saw these three pursuits had to
private interest, or render any one of them less conducive to it, than
any other? Thus one man's affection is to honour as his end; in order to
obtain which he thinks no pains too great. Suppose another, with such a
singularity of mind, as to have the same affection to public good as his
end, which he endeavours with the same labour to obtain. In case of
success, surely the man of benevolence hath as great enjoyment as the man
of ambition; they both equally having the end their affections, in the
same degree, tended to; but in case of disappointment, the benevolent man
has clearly the advantage; since endeavouring to do good, considered as a
virtuous pursuit, is gratified by its own consciousness, _i.e._, is in a
degree its own reward.
And as to these two, or benevolence and any other particular passions
whatever, considered in a further view, as forming a general temper,
which more or less disposes us for enjoyment of all the common blessings
of life, distinct from their
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