ccasion to observe, another
sense put upon these words. On the other hand, particular affections
tend towards particular external things: these are their objects: having
these is their end: in this consists their gratification: no matter
whether it be, or be not, upon the whole, our interest or happiness. An
action done from the former of these principles is called an interested
action. An action proceeding from any of the latter has its denomination
of passionate, ambitious, friendly, revengeful, or any other, from the
particular appetite or affection from which it proceeds. Thus self-love
as one part of human nature, and the several particular principles as the
other part, are, themselves, their objects and ends, stated and shown.
From hence it will be easy to see how far, and in what ways, each of
these can contribute and be subservient to the private good of the
individual. Happiness does not consist in self-love. The desire of
happiness is no more the thing itself than the desire of riches is the
possession or enjoyment of them. People might love themselves with the
most entire and unbounded affection, and yet be extremely miserable.
Neither can self-love any way help them out, but by setting them on work
to get rid of the causes of their misery, to gain or make use of those
objects which are by nature adapted to afford satisfaction. Happiness or
satisfaction consists only in the enjoyment of those objects which are by
nature suited to our several particular appetites, passions, and
affections. So that if self-love wholly engrosses us, and leaves no room
for any other principle, there can be absolutely no such thing at all as
happiness or enjoyment of any kind whatever; since happiness consists in
the gratification of particular passions, which supposes the having of
them. Self-love then does not constitute _this_ or _that_ to be our
interest or good; but, our interest or good being constituted by nature
and supposed, self-love only puts us upon obtaining and securing it.
Therefore, if it be possible that self-love may prevail and exert itself
in a degree or manner which is not subservient to this end; then it will
not follow that our interest will be promoted in proportion to the degree
in which that principle engrosses us, and prevails over others. Nay,
further, the private and contracted affection, when it is not subservient
to this end, private good may, for anything that appears, have a direct
contr
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