the man. Upon comparing the action
and the whole nature, there arises no disproportion, there appears no
unsuitableness, between them. Thus the _murder of a father_ and the
_nature of man_ correspond to each other, as the same nature and an act
of filial duty. If there be no difference between inward principles, but
only that of strength, we can make no distinction between these two
actions, considered as the actions of such a creature; but in our coolest
hours must approve or disapprove them equally: than which nothing can be
reduced to a greater absurdity.

SERMON III.

The natural supremacy of reflection or conscience being thus established,
we may from it form a distinct notion of what is meant by _human nature_
when virtue is said to consist in following it, and vice in deviating
from it.

As the idea of a civil constitution implies in it united strength,
various subordinations under one direction--that of the supreme
authority--the different strength of each particular member of the
society not coming into the idea--whereas, if you leave out the
subordination, the union, and the one direction, you destroy and lose
it--so reason, several appetites, passions, and affections, prevailing in
different degrees of strength, is not _that_ idea or notion of _human
nature_; but _that nature_ consists in these several principles
considered as having a natural respect to each other, in the several
passions being naturally subordinate to the one superior principle of
reflection or conscience. Every bias, instinct, propension within, is a
natural part of our nature, but not the whole: add to these the superior
faculty whose office it is to adjust, manage, and preside over them, and
take in this its natural superiority, and you complete the idea of human
nature. And as in civil government the constitution is broken in upon
and violated by power and strength prevailing over authority; so the
constitution of man is broken in upon and violated by the lower faculties
or principles within prevailing over that which is in its nature supreme
over them all. Thus, when it is said by ancient writers that tortures
and death are not so contrary to human nature as injustice, by this, to
be sure, is not meant that the aversion to the former in mankind is less
strong and prevalent than their aversion to the latter, but that the
former is only contrary to our nature considered in a partial view, and
which takes in only the low