o each particular person's heart and natural
conscience: as the external senses are appealed to for the proof of
things cognisable by them. Since, then, our inward feelings, and the
perceptions we receive from our external senses, are equally real, to
argue from the former to life and conduct is as little liable to
exception as to argue from the latter to absolute speculative truth. A
man can as little doubt whether his eyes were given him to see with as he
can doubt of the truth of the science of _optics_, deduced from ocular
experiments. And allowing the inward feeling, shame, a man can as little
doubt whether it was given him to prevent his doing shameful actions as
he can doubt whether his eyes were given him to guide his steps. And as
to these inward feelings themselves, that they are real, that man has in
his nature passions and affections, can no more be questioned than that
he has external senses. Neither can the former be wholly mistaken,
though to a certain degree liable to greater mistakes than the latter.

There can be no doubt but that several propensions or instincts, several
principles in the heart of man, carry him to society, and to contribute
to the happiness of it, in a sense and a manner in which no inward
principle leads him to evil. These principles, propensions, or instincts
which lead him to do good are approved of by a certain faculty within,
quite distinct from these propensions themselves. All this hath been
fully made out in the foregoing discourse.

But it may be said, "What is all this, though true, to the purpose of
virtue and religion? these require, not only that we do good to others
when we are led this way, by benevolence or reflection happening to be
stronger than other principles, passions, or appetites, but likewise that
the _whole_ character be formed upon thought and reflection; that _every_
action be directed by some determinate rule, some other rule than the
strength and prevalency of any principle or passion. What sign is there
in our nature (for the inquiry is only about what is to be collected from
thence) that this was intended by its Author? Or how does so various and
fickle a temper as that of man appear adapted thereto? It may indeed be
absurd and unnatural for men to act without any reflection; nay, without
regard to that particular kind of reflection which you call conscience,
because this does belong to our nature. For as there never was a man but
who approv